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Abstract 
We present a dynamic framework for addressing execution barriers to commercialization strategies for 
technology entrepreneurs. Even if a particular commercialization path is preferred, it may not be feasible 
to implement at the outset. Instead, entrepreneurs can benefit from a “switchback” strategy in which a 
transitional commercialization path is undertaken on a temporary basis and for the purpose of enabling 
the preferred strategy. We introduce two switchback strategies: 1) “temporary competition” in which the 
entrepreneur initially competes in the product market in order to establish credibility and gain negotiating 
leverage before attempting to license; and 2) “temporary cooperation” in which the entrepreneur not only 
licenses to incumbents but also collaborates with them in order to gain expertise before entering the 
product market. We then identify circumstances under which a switchback strategy is indicated, as 
opposed to the adoption of a static commercialization strategy as described in the existing literature. We 
conclude by discussing managerial implications of these dynamic commercialization strategies. 
 
Keywords: commercialization strategy; dynamic strategies; technology licensing 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* Both authors contributed equally. We thank Martin Kenney, Scott Stern, and Simon Wakeman for 
helpful comments. We acknowledge funding from the Wharton Mack Institute for Innovation 
Management and the Kauffman Junior Faculty Fellowship. 
2 
!
1. INTRODUCTION 
A major contribution to both theory and practice during the past twenty-five years has been identifying 
factors that (should) shape technology entrepreneurs’ choice of how to commercialize a new innovation. 
The seminal work of Teece (1986) highlighted that, regardless of the potential of a new technology, 
innovators will fail to either create or capture value if they do not align their commercialization strategy 
with the environment. An essential early decision is whether the innovator will keep control of the 
innovation by incorporating it into an offering for the product market (thereby competing against 
incumbents), or instead cooperate with incumbents via licensing or other partnership arrangements such 
as alliances in hopes of accelerating growth. Key to this decision is establishing the degree to which the 
technology is excludable (e.g., via a patent) so that the entrepreneur is less susceptible to expropriation, as 
well as the innovator’s costs of developing complementary assets necessary to commercialize the 
invention (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). When innovators face a tight appropriability environment at the 
same time that the cost of assembling the requisite complementary assets is relatively high, licensing to 
incumbents is a winning commercialization strategy; otherwise, the innovator might be better off entering 
the product market (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006).  
While this literature has done much to advance our thinking on which strategies innovators ought to 
occupy given their commercialization environment, it has less to say about how entrepreneurs can 
overcome implementation barriers which might make it difficult to execute the preferred 
commercialization strategy. Consider the example of Italian inventor Mario Moretti Polegato. Finding his 
rubber-soled shoes unbearably hot on a trip to Nevada, Polegato pierced the soles with a knife to release 
excess heat. He refined the concept while working in his family’s local footwear company and eventually 
secured a patent for his “micro-pore” sole structure (Polegato, 1990). Given that the small firm lacked 
extensive manufacturing and distribution capabilities, he attempted to license his patent to established 
companies including Nike and Adidas (consistent with the prescriptions of the TCS literature). Unable to 
garner interest, Polegato reluctantly borrowed 500,000 euros to self-commercialize the technology. That 
his company, GEOX, eventually grew to become an international footwear brand indicates that Polegato’s 
inability to secure a licensing agreement was not due to poor quality (Pirro 2013).  
As in this example, many entrepreneurs may find it difficult to pursue their preferred commercialization 
strategy initially. Firms cannot implement a commercialization strategy involving external parties by fiat; 
doing so requires (re)configuring the necessary resources and securing commitments from the necessary 
participants. As the difficulty of executing particular commercialization strategies may differ, we 
conceptualize them as peaks of different heights to be scaled in order to obtain competitive advantage. A 
low peak may be easy to climb, but it may not afford great visibility or strategic advantage. A high peak is 
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attractive, but scaling a sharp grade may prove too difficult for a technology entrepreneur. Grades may be 
sharp for several reasons. Unproven technologies, especially when pioneered by inexperienced 
entrepreneurs, provide a sharp grade for innovators wanting to license, as potential partners may be 
reluctant to make specialized investments. A firm wishing to capture a higher share of rents by competing 
in the product market may find entering the product market a difficult hill to climb when it lacks 
specialized complementary assets or a clear path to developing them. For these and other reasons, the 
implementation of a desired strategy may seem to be blocked.  
An alternative approach to scaling otherwise-insurmountable peaks is to construct a switchback. Perhaps 
best known in the case of trains such as the Darjeeling Express making their way up steep mountains, a 
switchback involves taking a longer, indirect path. The train travels sideways up the hill at a lower grade 
than if it charged directly to the peak. At some point, the train stops and backtracks before continuing up 
the hill at a similarly-reduced grade but in the opposite direction, retracing some of its steps. Llobera and 
Sluckin (2007) show in simulation models that while direct paths are most efficient for climbing weakly 
inclined slopes, sufficiently steep grades are best scaled using switchbacks. Similarly, we suggest that 
entrepreneurs aspiring to a particular commercialization strategy but facing a steep climb may profit by 
constructing a “strategic switchback.” In this approach, they pursue a different strategy initially (and 
temporarily) but with the expectation of eventually returning to their preferred strategy. Although 
adopting a switchback strategy may seem counterintuitive or even wasteful, doing so may represent an 
entrepreneur’s most promising path to commercialization success.  
Switchback strategies are inherently dynamic, yet planned. Instead of choosing a single 
commercialization path, the entrepreneur maps out not just one point but a sequence of strategic positions 
without which the ultimate configuration could not be achieved. But it is important to distinguish the 
dynamic nature of a switchback strategy from other types of dynamic strategies. First, the literature on 
dynamic capabilities is primarily concerned with the responses of incumbents to environmental shifts 
(Haveman, 1992; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Tripsas, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). By 
contrast, we focus on early-stage entrepreneurs. Second, we distinguish our argument from 
entrepreneurial experimentation (Bhide 2000; Murray and Tripsas 2004; Gavetti and Rivkin 2007), which 
can be a critical tool for entrepreneurs facing uncertainty regarding a particular strategic choice. 
Experimentation is inherently dynamic (unless the first experiment proves successful). Here, we argue 
that an entrepreneur might implement a deliberately dynamic strategy even in the absence of uncertainty 
regarding the ideal strategy. Rather, cognizant of implementation barriers to that final strategy, the 
founder undertakes a switchback in order to facilitate the eventual adoption of the preferred strategy.  
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Note that we do not advocate the universal adoption of switchback strategies. Rather, switchbacks will be 
attractive only when the expected profits from implementing the preferred strategy at the outset are lower 
than the expected profits from initial implementation of the temporary strategy and the (discounted) 
profits from the subsequent implementation of the preferred strategy, less the costs of switching from 
temporary to preferred. Profits from the subsequent implementation of the preferred strategy are 
discounted given the risk that the temporary strategy may reduce the ability of the firm to profit from the 
preferred strategy (e.g., expropriation, as we discuss below). 
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: in sections 2 and 3, we discuss and illustrate two 
strategic switchback strategies: temporary competition and temporary cooperation. In section 4, we 
discuss implications for entrepreneurial and incumbent firm managers. We then discuss the contribution 
of these “switchback strategies” to the literature and conclude in section 5. 
 
2. TEMPORARY COMPETITION AS A SWITCHBACK STRATEGY 
Temporary competition involves switching from a product market entry strategy to a cooperative 
(licensing or alliance-based) strategy. The main rationale for initial entry into the product market is for the 
entrepreneur to verify the technical and/or commercial importance of an innovation in order to attract 
would-be commercialization partners and to strike favorable deal terms. 
As is well recognized in the literature, a cooperative commercialization strategy in which one licenses 
technology to incumbents can have many advantages including specialization and gains from trade. Yet 
frictions such as the risk of expropriation may discourage an innovator from pursuing what might be an 
otherwise attractive path. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) show that licensing is optimal when the 
innovation is appropriable but the entrant lacks complementary assets required to commercialize. Gans, 
Hsu, and Stern (2008) show that acquiring intellectual property rights (i.e., a patent allowance) is a key 
antecedent of licensing; in its absence, innovators may have little choice but to enter the product market.  
Extant literature, however, views the commercialization decision as static: the innovator either licenses 
the discovery or enters the product market, depending on the environment for complementary assets and 
excludability. We propose multiple scenarios in which the innovator may not license (at first) though such 
a path would seem to be the preferred outcome for the innovator given the recommendations of the TCS 
literature. Rather, the innovator starts by entering the product market to overcome some friction and then 
later switches to the preferred licensing mode. We discuss various types of frictions that may favor this 
dynamic commercialization strategy and also consider preconditions underlying the ability to eventually 
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switch strategy. The key question underlying this part of our analysis is: for an innovator that would in 
theory be best served by licensing (or more generally, cooperative commercialization), why might it 
instead first enter the product market?  
 
2.1 Temporary competition motives 
In this section, we explore the factors favoring a switchback strategy for an entrepreneur whose preferred 
commercialization mode is licensing but who faces implementation barriers that can be ameliorated via 
product market competition in the short run.  
2.1.1 Inability to attract licensees 
One scenario in which the innovator will not engage in the preferred licensing strategy is when the 
innovator is unable to attract the interest of a potential licensee. This may result from counterparty 
concerns regarding either the size of the market or the nature of the innovation itself. As long as concerns 
persist, the innovator may have no choice but to compete in the product market; moreover, doing so may 
help to establish the attractiveness of the technology or the market. 
Regarding the market, a potential licensee may be concerned that the market for an invention is either 
unclear or, if known, is too small to attract the resources of an incumbent given its other priorities 
(Christensen & Bower, 1996). Furthermore, even if the potential market is estimable and known to be 
large, it may threaten the incumbent’s existing line(s) of business and thus be deemed unattractive 
(Christensen, 1997).  
In addition, even if incumbents find the potential addressable market to be satisfactorily large, the 
incumbent may be dissuaded from entering into licensing arrangementswhen it finds that it would be 
required to make investments in order to co-specialize its complementary assets. As Teece observes, “it 
may be difficult to induce suppliers to make costly irreversible commitments which depend for their 
success on the success of the innovation…tak[ing] risks along with the innovator” (1986: 294). Key 
among these concerns may be uncertainty regarding the value of the innovator’s particular technology, a 
factor Arora and Gambardella (2010) claim has been neglected in the TCS literature.  
Such uncertainty may result when it is not straightforward to evaluate the technology, such as when clear 
metrics are not available or are disputed. Even if performance metrics have been agreed upon, it may be 
the case that the evaluation process is complicated and time-consuming. In the presence of many similar 
innovators, the cost of evaluating the value of various technologies may be prohibitively expensive. In the 
speech recognition industry, for example, it is quite difficult to establish whether one speech recognition 
6 
!
technology is superior to another because various recognition tasks demand different customization. For 
instance, the techniques used to recognize a credit-card number composed entirely of digits and having a 
summation check are very different than recognizing the open-ended response to a question like “how 
may I help you?” at the beginning of a customer service call. Thus it can be challenging for a licensee to 
determine whether the speech recognition technology from a particular vendor is superior to available 
alternatives.  
It might appear that one solution to this problem is having the licensee draw up contingent contracts with 
a number of innovators with a small up-front payment and larger royalty payments. Jensen and Thursby 
(2001) note the importance of royalty payments in giving the inventor an incentive for ongoing efforts in 
the commercialization process. Our concern, however, is the effort required not by the inventor but the 
licensee. If the complementary assets require substantial investment to be co-specialized, the licensee may 
not be able to simultaneously incorporate many multiple competing technologies. Furthermore, the 
licensee may have weak incentives to try to do so, particularly if the innovation is most relevant to niche 
market segments within which the licensee has not operated. Consider the case of a cell-phone 
manufacturer who must choose from among multiple operating systems including Symbian, Android, 
Windows Phone, Palm OS, Mee Go, and others. An operating system is an example of an innovation 
where it is not straightforward to deem one superior based on technical merits alone. Especially given that 
some operating systems are freely available, it might seem that a handset manufacturer could simply 
incorporate each of the competing operating systems and offer end-user products based on each platform. 
However, building a handset based on a particular operating system requires the co-specialization of 
handset hardware and software, requiring substantial resources from the organization to support the 
integration of each operating system. Thus entrepreneurs seeking licensees for their innovations cannot 
rely on incumbents’ willingness to hedge their bets by in-licensing unproven technologies broadly just in 
case the focal entrepreneur’s approach eventually proves superior. The problem is compounded if the 
incumbent has already invested in an alternative technological ecosystem or platform. 
Entering the product market can provide validation of the technology in multiple ways. End-user products 
may garner publicity from press or social media. End-users may provide valuable feedback on the 
integrated product which can be incorporated in future licensing agreements. Of course, sales volume can 
speak volumes. As a result, an innovator switchback strategy of first entering the product market can 
provide would-be licensees or alliance partners with more persuasive evidence of technical and market 
viability than would be achieved through proofs of concept or prototypes alone. 
Consider the early history of Qualcomm and its introduction of code-division multiple access (CDMA) 
technology for handling cellular communications. CDMA took the controversial approach of handling 
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multiple calls on the same frequency simultaneously and managing the interference as opposed 
sequentially as in TDMA (time-division multiple access). Although CDMA promised to be more efficient 
than TDMA, there were many skeptics, including a Stanford University professor who declared that the 
frequency-sharing approach would “violate the laws of physics” (Brodsky 2008: 199) and accused 
Qualcomm of faking its first demonstration. The firm temporarily manufactured both base stations and 
handsets in order to prove the value of CDMA technology. In personal communication, Qualcomm co-
founder Andrew Viterbi (2012) recounted: 
“[F]or this large and complex opportunity it was essential to produce the infrastructure as well as 
the handsets…it was necessary to convince the carriers that CDMA was indeed a workable 
technology which had a major advantage over alternates: GSM, U.S. and Japanese TDMA 
standards. All of this took a lot of effort, several successful demonstrations, some luck and about 
three or four years; there were many skeptics.” 
Qualcomm did not, however, remain in the product market permanently. It was eager to exit the capital-
intensive manufacturing of handsets and base stations and refocus its efforts on the more profitable 
business of licensing technology. After a few years, it thus sold the base station business to Ericsson and 
handset operations to Kyocera. Qualcomm’s decision to temporarily enter the product market and 
subsequently switch to the preferred licensing model serves as an example of how firms can demonstrate 
the value of their technology to would-be partners by temporarily competing in the product market.  
The early experience of commercializing Research In Motion’s BlackBerry followed a similar path. As 
Somaya, Teece, and Wakeman (2011: 51) recount:  
“In the early days, the BlackBerry service was unique in that RIM provided everything needed to 
make it work: the device itself, the software that made it run, the servers that routed e-mail from 
the wired network, and the airtime that RIM leased from mobile-phone carriers. In other words, 
RIM adopted a highly integrated organizational model, which enabled the company to retain 
control over and coordinate all aspects of its service. However, this arrangement was also 
reinforced by the challenges of transacting with other firms (such as the mobile-phone carriers 
who supplied the airtime) and convincing them to partake in what was still a nascent business. As 
chairman and co-CEO Jim Balsillie later explained ‘[There] was really a lack of interest, in the 
rest of the market, to work with us…in partnering with us until we became successful’…By 
offering to license, RIM was able to access the innovative resources of the entire 
industry…leaving [it] able to focus on what it did best: wireless e-mail.’” 
Marx, Gans and Hsu (2013) examine the case of disruptive innovations, in which the technology initially 
lags in the predominant performance metric, but has a favorable trajectory of improvement. Using data 
from the speech recognition industry, these authors find that when innovations are disruptive, entrants 
tend to (like Qualcomm and RIM) first compete in the product market and only later engage in licensing. 
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2.1.2 Desire to establish leverage by delaying licensing 
Even if incumbents have little doubt about the value of the entrant’s technology and believe that the size 
of the addressable market is satisfactorily large, the innovator may nonetheless be unwilling to enter 
partnerships and may want to delay licensing even if that commercialization mode would be the preferred 
long-term path. Such a strategy may be driven by a desire to increase negotiating leverage for the 
entrepreneur—whether over intellectual property, branding, exclusivity, or other issues. Just as the threat 
of entering the product market can give an innovator leverage in a licensing negotiation (Gans and Stern, 
2000), experience and reputation in the product market can increase the eventual revenue from licensing 
as the licensee has more to gain by potentially removing competitors from the product market. 
Clearly an innovator may hesitate to license for lack of intellectual property protection (Gans, Hsu, and 
Stern 2008). The patent process can easily take several years, and although most patent applications are 
eventually granted (Quillen & Webster, 2001) the scope of the final claim set may be reduced. Hence, the 
innovator is faced with an extended period of time during which intellectual property rights (IPR) are not 
afforded, coupled with the possibility that such rights, when granted, may not be as far-reaching as might 
be hoped. For a large firm with a large portfolio of innovations—say, an incumbent chemical producer—
waiting for the patent to issue may not be a problem since the firm can divert its energies elsewhere. A 
new entrant, however, may find it difficult to tread water while waiting for the patent to issue. 
Temporarily competing in the product market provides an alternative in the interim.  
A nascent venture may be concerned about other types of leverage as well, including brand visibility and 
commoditization. A new firm is by definition not well known, and although affiliation with prominent 
intermediaries can help bring visibility (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999), the firm may find it difficult to 
command pricing power right away, as brand development and reputation only develops over time. 
Consequently, executing an “Intel Inside” premium pricing strategy reflects prior investments in brand 
development. With end-users unaware of the source of the technology, it is easier for licensees to 
substitute other technology providers (or threaten to) and thus negotiate down the entrant’s licensing fees.   
By first entering the product market, the entrant can establish end-consumer visibility and create demand 
for its particular innovation as opposed to substitutes. Accordingly, it may receive more favorable terms 
when eventually negotiating a license. Consider the experience of FINsix Corporation, an MIT spinoff 
commercializing high-frequency power converters. These converters enable the firm to eliminate the 
heavy “brick” attached to most laptop power cords. Although CEO Vanessa Green originally considered 
licensing their patented technology to laptop manufacturers in order to accelerate distribution, she became 
concerned that the small startup might not be able to negotiate attractive licenses given its youth and 
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inexperience. Instead, the firm announced plans to manufacture “brickless” laptop power cords and sell 
them through retail channels in order to build awareness and possibly a recognizable brand prior to 
licensing. Green hopes that this switchback strategy will enable the company to negotiate more 
aggressively (Green 2013). Startups who cannot attract the attention of potential licensees due in part to 
their status as unknowns, like GEOX’s Polegato, may have no choice but to start in the product market. 
Delaying licensing in order to improve an innovator’s bargaining position speaks to the issue of dividing 
a given size “pie” of value creation with the potential commercialization partner. However, in the process 
of further developing an innovation, the innovator may also be able to create further value (thereby 
creating a larger pie). This may stem from discovering broader applicability across markets or further uses 
within a given target market. In such cases, alongside potentially enhancing its bargaining power in a 
given use domain, the innovator may also benefit from expanding the possible addressable domains.   
 
2.2 Preconditions for Temporary Competition  
Temporarily competing in the product market—whether due to inability or unwillingness to license—may 
be an attractive option for several reasons but can be most successful when entrants are able to efficiently 
enter and then exit the product market. However, successfully executing a switchback strategy requires 
several conditions.  
 
2.2.1 Product market entry 
As discussed extensively in the literature on technology commercialization, product market entry will be 
possible only if the entrant can afford to create the requisite complementary assets. Indeed, an attractive 
aspect of licensing is not having to invest in such. Thus, entrants wishing to compete, even temporarily, 
into the product market must have or be able to attract the resources to develop the requisite assets 
themselves. Early-stage startups may need to fund complementary-asset development with external 
financing such as from venture capitalists. 
In some industries such as biotechnology or semiconductor manufacturing, complementary assets may be 
prohibitively expensive for a new venture to consider developing independently. In other industries, while 
it may be strongly preferable to have a licensee supply the complementary assets, it may nonetheless be 
feasible for an entrant to invest (perhaps by raising substantial outside funding). There may also be 
substantial within-industry variability in the feasibility of temporary competition as submarkets within an 
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industry may possess different challenges and opportunities for entry, depending on the nature of an 
innovation and the underlying economics of product market entry.  
Note that in some situations there may be multiple types of complementary assets required, some of 
which can be developed by the startup and others of which cannot. For example, in business-to-consumer 
ventures the complementary assets required to go to market may differ from those required to scale the 
business. Releasing a product to consumers may require primarily technical complementary assets that are 
not prohibitively expensive, while scaling such a business may require multimillion-dollar investments in 
customer acquisition. In such scenarios, it can be advantageous for the entrant to enter the product market 
with the aspiration of developing brand reputation and proving the value of the technology and market 
while patent applications work their way through the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Then, 
with those assets in place, the firm can move to a licensing or cooperative commercialization model with 
partners who have existing customer relationships and channels.  
 
2.2.2 Switching to licensing  
The startup likely has dual aims in switching from the product market to licensing. First, the entrant hopes 
to reduce the cost of operating the business by exiting less-attractive complementary assets. Second, the 
entrant hopes to leverage licensees’ complementary assets. To take advantage of the first benefit, the firm 
must be able to reduce its own investment in unattractive complementary assets. This can take the form 
either of fully divesting those businesses, as when Qualcomm sold its manufacturing operations to 
Kyocera and Ericsson, or simply de-emphasizing an end-user product by stopping work on future 
upgrades and minimizing ongoing support.  
Indeed, for small firms, reducing product market investment may not only be preferable from a 
profitability perspective but essential in order to summon the resources needed to support licensees. 
Samsung, for example, did not insist that Vlingo Corporation pull its consumer product from the market 
when signing a license to incorporate Vlingo’s underlying technology into its S-Voice offering. 
Nonetheless, Vlingo CTO Mike Phillips noted that the Samsung deal led to a de facto shutdown of its 
product market efforts as all available resources needed to be diverted to support Samsung: “we cut back 
on the consumer effort. We didn’t want to but in fact that was a hard decision in the company. Making 
sure to sequester 10-12 people to work on direct to consumer would have been great but the pressure 
meant we needed to divert the resources” (Philips 2013). 
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Of course by starting with a product entry strategy, not only does the organization incur the costs of 
downstream vertical integration (or alternatively, accessing these assets via contractual means, such as 
through an outsourcing relationship), but it must then incur the costs of reversing that organizational 
scope. While divestiture may at first blush seem simple in that assets such as physical equipment, 
property, and the like can be disengaged and potentially repurposed or salvaged, there may be more 
complex issues in shifting the organization’s commercialization strategy away from product market entry. 
First, the more the organization’s downstream assets were developed specifically to match the innovator’s 
upstream position, the less salvage value will likely be associated with the asset under divestiture. Second, 
without the direct linkage with the end consumer or purchasing agent as a result of the new licensing 
strategy, future development and versions of the firm’s product or service may not be able to incorporate 
feedback from that audience as tightly. Pursuing a licensing strategy may still yield information about the 
preferences of the final consumers, though the feedback loop is not as direct and will be filtered through 
the lens of the licensee.  
Another precondition to entering the licensing market is that the entrant has not already disclosed so much 
information about the innovation in the integrated product that licensing is no longer attractive to 
potential partners. While this is unlikely to be a concern in “black box” industries like software or 
microelectronics, with consumer products one might be concerned that competitors could disassemble 
and reverse-engineer the innovation. Anton and Yao (2002) suggest that an important appropriability 
mechanism in a cooperative commercialization strategy is the ability to selectively disclose innovation 
details to the would-be partner. For “switchback” entrepreneurs who plan to compete in the product 
market before attempting to license, the need to avoid disclosure is even greater. This is sometimes 
difficult, however. In some cases, the simple act of broad revelation, as may inherently be the case in 
product market entry, may spur subsequent competition. This then becomes an important reversal cost 
consideration in implementing a switchback strategy.  
As an example, consider the case of the Pebble “smartwatch,” a product that can communicate with a 
smartphone and can run a variety of applications. The watch raised funding through the crowdsourcing 
platform, Kickstarter, in April 2012. Although requesting just $100,000 in funds, the product raised 
$10.2M in a five-week period from nearly 69,000 backers, and garnered considerable media attention. 
Some analysts (e.g., Novellino, 2013) believe that the highly visible oversubscription provided incentives 
and valuable market information to possible competitors to the Pebble watch. As of mid-2013, a number 
of industry incumbents, including Acer, Apple, Google, Foxconn/Hon Hai, Microsoft, Qualcomm, 
Samsung, Sony, and Toshiba were reportedly engaged in product development in the nascent smartwatch 
segment. Pebble Technologies may therefore have benefited from alternative possible funding sources 
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which would have entailed comparatively less public disclosure, though the company’s ability to raise a 
subsequent $15M venture capital round may not have been possible without the successful crowdfunding 
campaign.  
* * * 
Overall, temporary competition can be a valuable startup switchback strategy for entrant-innovators who 
view a cooperative commercialization strategy as the desired end state, but due to their inability to 
initially attract partners and/or their desire to delay partnership, decide to temporarily compete in the 
product market. Such a dynamic strategy can help validate an innovation to would-be partners and/or 
enhance the entrants bargaining power in the deal-making process. Executing a temporary competition 
strategy, spanning initial product market entry and subsequently switching to a cooperative 
commercialization strategy, comes with its own set of challenges. We discuss implications for startup and 
incumbent firm managers in Section 4. 
 
3. TEMPORARY COOPERATION AS A SWITCHBACK STRATEGY 
The switchback strategy of temporary competition is designed to enable an entrepreneur to eventually 
implement a licensing strategy despite initial obstacles. Next, we consider the scenario in which licensing 
is not the desired outcome. For example, Fosfuri (2006) presents theory and evidence that highly 
differentiated technologies may be best brought to the product market directly in order to avoid the profit-
dissipation effect, the diminution of revenues associated with licensing a new competitor into the market. 
Gans (2012) argues that experience in the product market may fuel future technological leadership. 
Wakeman (2007) relates experiences of biotech executives being held up by pharmaceutical licensees 
who allowed commercialization of the startup’s drug to languish. In these and other cases, while the end 
goal of the firm may be to enter the product market, there may be a variety of difficulties in doing so 
directly. In this section, we introduce a temporary cooperation strategy, which involves a switchback 
from initial cooperative partnering to a competitive product market entry strategy. Consider the example 
of the early history of Genentech. Robert Swanson, co-founder of the company, recounts:  
“It was a goal from the very beginning to make and market products as soon as we could. The 
first products we licensed to others. We tried to keep some manufacturing rights but let other 
people market. That was the case of interferon with [Hoffman-La] Roche, but eventually we 
decided it was better to put our energy into the products we could make and sell ourselves…Now, 
why is it that you need to be an integrated pharmaceutical company? Over the long run…in order 
to capture all the value from the research that develops a new drug that treats a disease, you have 
to be able to make and sell that drug yourself, in part to control the distribution of it, not relying 
on someone else; and in part because you capture greater rewards by selling it yourself. Over the 
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long run, unless you capture those rewards, you cannot invest as much in R&D that allows you to 
develop the second and third products…It [directly entering the product market] can’t be done at 
once obviously, but as soon as you can I always felt that you needed to do that.” (Swanson, 2000, 
pp. 78-79).  
This account describes the essential set of motivations for employing a temporary cooperation switchback 
strategy: developing specialized complementary assets by first partnering with an established firm. 
Because of the benefits of control in some circumstances for value capture, eventually switching 
strategies away from a cooperative mode to product market competition can be performance-enhancing. 
Maged Nofal, CEO of Nesrsoft, a company in the speech recognition industry, expressed a similar 
sentiment: “It’s a lot easier to just sit back and sell the licenses. But we found that selling a motor without 
the car is a big disadvantage. Customers want to sit in the car” (Nofal, 2012). 
Of course, if the product market were the preferred commercialization path and complementary assets 
were straightforward to develop or otherwise access, the entrepreneur would enter immediately; we focus 
instead on the scenario where complementary assets are difficult to develop and are “specialized” (Teece, 
1986). As in the case of temporary competition, entrepreneurs may understand the need for a switchback 
strategy only after having attempted licensing themselves. Others, possibly having seen peer startups 
struggle with licensing, may at the outset see a cooperative joint commercialization strategy as a stepping 
stone to acquiring specialized complementary assets. 
 
3.1. Temporary Cooperation motives 
3.1.1 Focusing on technical development 
While the rationale for innovator technology licensing is varied, spanning motives such as geographic and 
product domain reach (e.g., Caves, Crookell, and Killing 1983), one significant motivation for innovators 
to originally adopt a licensing strategy is to allow the innovator to specialize on technical development at 
the outset. To the extent that the organization simultaneously tries to assemble the relevant 
complementary assets in-house, this might slow down the pace of technical development, which might be 
especially costly in arenas marked by racing behavior, such as when there are strong first mover 
advantages. Alongside the general notion that emerging organizations are typically resource constrained, 
and so would benefit from the ability to focus their development efforts, entrepreneurs may also wish to 
strategically decide which products to initially commercialize through partnerships, and which products 
might be good candidates for the purposes of product market entry. For example, consider Genentech’s 
early logic for identifying human growth hormone as a good candidate for product market entry:  
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“Well, from the very beginning, I set the goal that as soon as we could, we wanted to make our 
own products and sell them. Obviously we couldn’t do that right away. We had to be careful 
which products we took first to do that with. With human insulin, Eli Lilly dominated the market 
with 80 percent market share. It was sold through pharmacies. It would have been a very difficult 
product for us to take to market ourselves. On the other hand, growth hormone—which was the 
first product we did take through the FDA approval process and make and sell ourselves—was 
then being distributed by a quasi-governmental agency…so here was something where there were 
really no entrenched competitors. We had an alternative that would be safer. This was the kind of 
product that a small company like Genentech might be able to take to the market itself. Also, the 
government approval process—although more difficult than we imagined because of our naivety 
in terms of understanding what it took to go through that process—was straightforward in the 
sense that either the children were growing or not. So the end point was easy to measure.” 
(Swanson, 2000, p. 77). 
Note that in this example, the decision not to enter the product market directly with Genentech’s human 
insulin product (instead licensing it to Eli Lilly) probably contributed to the ability of the firm to focus 
their efforts on developing other products, in part leading to their human growth hormone product.  
 
3.1.2 Developing specialized complementary assets 
A second (and primary) motivation for switching from a commercialization strategy of cooperating with 
industry incumbents to competition, somewhat distinct from but related to technical focus discussed 
above, is the desire to develop specialized organizational complementary assets. One of the main 
challenges for firms is developing an organizational structure to capture the economic value 
commensurate with the quality of their technological innovation (Teece, 1986). Particularly for new 
ventures, a licensing strategy that avoids duplicating complementary assets typically held by industry 
incumbents would seem to be attractive. Such a strategy would also allow efficient specialization: startups 
could have the comparative advantage in upstream innovation while industry incumbents would have the 
edge in downstream commercialization capabilities – and both types of firms would be better off as a 
result of the exchange. When downstream complementary assets such as marketing expertise or 
navigating regulatory processes are specialized in the sense that they are unique and difficult to access on 
the open market, entrepreneurs will have difficulty developing them, and so this becomes a substantial 
barrier to entry. Despite the practical importance of this aspect of entrepreneurial organizational 
development, the literature has only a limited treatment of this issue.  
Entrepreneurs facing this situation might consider two actions. A first course of action would be to try to 
develop the specialized assets alone. However, doing so will be time consuming and relatively expensive 
in the sense that mistakes and missteps will likely be made in the process. The opposite alternative is to 
engage in arm’s-length licensing of the technology or innovation to another party who possesses the 
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specialized complementary assets. This may be attractive because the startup avoids having to recreate the 
complementary assets incumbent firms have already built. From that standpoint, such a “hands-off” 
relationship may be societally efficient, notwithstanding the possible socially-productive effects of 
enhanced market competition. However, a possible downside to this strategy is that much of the learning 
involved with experiential “doing” is lost in arm’s length technology transfer (Gans, 2012). This might 
not be problematic if the new venture has no aspirations for entering the product market in the future. 
However, to the extent that the firm develops routines and competences in a given commercialization 
mode, changing modes might be difficult and costly (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009).  
A switchback strategy the startup may consider is initially entering into a partnership with an industry 
incumbent for purposes of learning complementary asset development. After a period of time, the new 
enterprise may be ready to switch from licensing and enter the product market by itself. A two-step 
commercialization strategy of initial joint commercialization with a partner, followed by product market 
entry, may lessen the costs of learning to develop specialized complementary assets. As compared to a 
strategy of self-commercialization, this type of switchback strategy economizes on learning costs. As 
compared to a cooperation strategy, the switchback allows option value as to future self-
commercialization (Hsu & Wakeman, 2013). 
The computer hardware industry in Taiwan illustrates how upstart technology ventures looking to develop 
themselves as global players by developing specialized complementary assets. Taiwanese companies such 
as Asustek, Acer, and HTC got their start by being original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to other 
firms – producing electronic hardware components according to received specifications. One of the 
downsides of being completely reliant on partners, however, is the lack of control and interaction with 
end-users. The knowledge and anticipation of consumer preferences, together with possessing a brand 
reputation, are specialized complementary assets in the computer and electronic hardware industries.  
In their aspiration to develop such assets and move up the value chain, Asustek, Acer, and HTC each 
eventually began conducting original design manufacturing (ODM) in which the contracting firm would 
allow the manufacturer to design and produce the component. Thereafter, the firms felt positioned to 
begin marketing some products with their own brand label, thereby building consumer awareness of their 
integrated products. These efforts, however, were often not at the exclusion of also providing OEM and 
ODM services to the marketplace. In summary, if these Taiwanese firms with aspirations to be directly 
customer-facing had instead directly entered the product market, they might have been less successful. 
Partnering with industry incumbents enabled the firms to gradually acquire production experience while 
being insulated from the risk of commercial acceptance.    
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The same phenomenon of desiring to develop specialized complementary assets to become an integrated 
company also holds true for entrants in the biotechnology industry. Some of the most important 
specialized complementary assets in the drug industry are navigating the regulatory landscape and 
marketing drugs to physicians. A few biotechnology firms have managed to become “fully integrated 
biopharmaceutical companies” (FIBCOs) as a result of a sequenced commercialization strategy of first 
collaborating with established pharmaceutical companies to attain exposure to the specialized 
complementary assets and funding to support those activities. While not necessarily abandoning those 
partnerships, the experience gained from prior collaborative commercialization has allowed 
biotechnology firms such as Genentech, Amgen, Genzyme, Regeneron, and Onyx to achieve downstream 
organizational commercialization capabilities.  
 
3.2 Difficulties in executing a temporary cooperation strategy  
3.2.1 Changing internal organizational structure and incentives to align with the new strategy 
Changing commercialization strategies from a cooperative to a competitive one is likely to be disruptive 
organizationally, perhaps akin to what Baron et al. (1996) describe in changing human resource 
management (HRM) practices within emerging organizations. They study mid-course changes in the 
archetypal HRM model ventures adopt – and find that such changes are highly disruptive and associated 
with worse organizational outcomes, perhaps because the processes of selecting, attracting, and retaining 
employees are all affected by altered HRM systems. At a high level, Aggarwal and Hsu (2009) find that 
changing from a licensing-only strategy to a different commercialization mode in a sample of 
biotechnology firms is associated with negative valuation consequences. This might result from the 
disruption in organizational routines and structure inevitably accompanying the shift in commercialization 
strategy. Prior to the shift, much emphasis is placed on the lines of communication connecting the internal 
operations of the firm to the external party. Moreover, the organizational span of scope and operations 
under a cooperative commercialization strategy is relatively focused as compared to the broader set of 
skills and expertise required to support a product entry strategy..  
 
3.2.2 Channel conflict with former cooperation partners 
Knowing that potential cooperation partners would not engage in joint commercialization if they believed 
that the focal company would ever directly enter the product market, some firms stake their reputation on 
17 
!
not changing their strategy in this way. A firm undertaking a temporary cooperation strategy must realize 
that today’s partners may become tomorrow’s competitors when the move is made from licensing to 
product-market entry. Particular risks include the loss of licensing revenue as former partners defect and 
before product-market revenue ramps up.  
As an example, Nuance Communications expressed its concerns about channel conflict when announcing 
a switch from licensing to product-market entry. A trade journal article cited that in “a strategy shift 
which the company admitted carried short-term ‘revenue risk,’ the company is shifting to more direct 
sales and to selling products that will put it in competition with some of its partners” (Meisel 2002). In 
that same article, Nuance CEO Ron Croen acknowledged that moving to direct sales “may result in some 
sales that would otherwise go to partners…[but] that Nuance’s evangelizing speech solutions should also 
increase total demand, and that partners could compete on the advantages of their particular solutions.” 
Although Nuance was eventually successful, part of its ability to overcome channel conflict may have 
been the commanding industry presence it had built during its first nine years. Startups planning to 
undertake a temporary cooperation strategy might plan an extended period of cooperation in order to 
build the sort of reputation that enables it to handle channel conflict which might threaten a weaker firm.1 
 
3.2.3 Expropriation risks 
Finally, the innovator first attempting a licensing strategy (or more generally adopting a cooperative 
commercialization strategy with industry incumbents) followed by entry into the product market may be 
exposed to expropriation costs associated with the switchback strategy. The borders of the innovating 
organization are invariably opened with cooperative commercialization. This occurs at a minimum at the 
time of deal terms negotiation, as agreeing to terms necessitates disclosure. Moreover, depending on the 
negotiated scope of the collaboration, the degree of inter-organizational interaction may be a further 
source of permeable organizational boundaries on an ongoing basis. For example, scientific personnel 
may be exchanged in the context of cooperative commercialization, which may lead to the observed 
pattern that knowledge can flow easily between alliance partners, whether intended or not (Gomes-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Established firms also struggle with channel conflict. Consider Microsoft’s shift from licensing its Windows 
operating system to selling devices including the Surface tablet. Microsoft noted the risk of releasing its Surface 
tablet instead of only licensing the Windows operating system to its hardware partners as had been its 
commercialization strategy for decades: “Our Surface devices will compete with products made by our OEM 
partners, which may affect their commitment to our platform” (Microsoft, 2012). At least one licensee threatened to 
abandon Microsoft: Acer CEO JT Wang told the Financial Times, “We have said to them, ‘think it over. Think 
twice. It will create a huge negative impact for the ecosystem.’” (Budden and Mishkin, 2012).  
!
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Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe, 2006). While there may be a variety of contractual and non-contractual 
mechanisms to curtail unintended knowledge leakage across organizational boundaries, such efforts are 
likely imperfect. This risk is heightened given the typical asymmetric resources (and appetite) that startup 
innovators have in comparison with more established industry incumbents toward dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, in the switchback to a product entry strategy, the innovator may be more likely to encounter 
conflict situations with former cooperation partners, such as the channel conflict issues discussed above. 
* * * 
Overall, temporary cooperation can be a valuable startup switchback strategy for entrant-innovators who 
view a product entry commercialization strategy as the desired end state. Such a dynamic strategy of 
transiently cooperating with partners can help the innovator develop specialized complementary assets at 
a possibly lower cost relative to a direct strategy of product market entry. Executing a temporary 
cooperation strategy comes with its own set of challenges, including channel conflict with former partners 
and potential organizational structure/incentive costs. We discuss implications for startup and incumbent 
firm managers in the next section. 
 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEURS (AND INCUMBENTS) 
Our dynamic framework for commercialization strategy suggests that barriers to the realization of a 
preferred path may indicate an indirect, “switchback” strategy in which the entrepreneur initially pursues 
an apparently-undesirable strategy designed to enable the preferred TCS. These insights hold several 
implications for technology entrepreneurs and incumbents alike who contemplate participating in a 
switchback strategy. This section presumes that the entrepreneur has identified the preferred 
commercialization strategy as per the extant TCS literature. 
 
4.1 Temporary competition considerations 
4.1.1 Considerations for technology entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs interested in (eventually) pursuing a licensing strategy should consider a number of factors 
before embarking on that path. First, given that IPR is a virtual prerequisite to technology licensing, at 
what point does the startup expect to have the patent? Although most patents are eventually granted 
(Quillen and Webster, 2001), filing and responding to office actions can take several years. Even if 
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potential licensees are willing to sign a contract in advance of the patent issue, is the entrepreneur willing 
to take the risk of disclosure in the event that the patent does not issue? What if the scope of claims is 
reduced substantially? 
Even if patents are secured, this is a necessary and not sufficient precondition to licensing if the value of 
the technology is in question. The burden of the USPTO is not to evaluate whether a given technology is 
superior to what came before—only that it is sufficiently distinct in its approach not to infringe on 
previously-granted IP. Thus, the mere acquisition of a patent does not necessarily take care of the 
technology-value uncertainty.2 
Entering into the product market may help to resolve concerns regarding the value of the technology, but 
if this is the purpose of product-market competition the entrepreneur should calibrate efforts accordingly. 
Instead of growing sales volume or optimizing operations for revenue or profitability as would be 
appropriate if planning to permanently compete in the product market, the entrepreneur may instead sell 
products at a loss (or even give them away) in order to maximize reach and customer feedback useful to 
iterating and improving the product. Further, the startup should seek opportunities to highlight its 
progress in the press so that potential licensees take notice. Maintaining a high profile is important not 
only for establishing the value of the technology but also to build negotiating leverage prior to entering 
licensing negotiations. The entrepreneur may seek to build a brand before agreeing to license by 
temporarily competing in the product market.  
Of course, entrepreneurs deciding to temporarily enter the product market must have sufficient resources 
to build the required complementary assets. If one cannot raise a large amount of funding early on, 
assurances of support for a switchback strategy must be sought in the case that investments are “staged” 
contingent on performance (Gompers, 1995). 
Finally, there may be a host of organizational transition challenges accompanying the switch from a 
revenue model emphasizing product market entry to one based primarily on a cooperative 
commercialization strategy. Consider the following account of organizational structure changes 
associated with a partnering strategy:  
“To win contracts to supply the likes of Hewlett-Packard and Dell, Taiwanese companies 
routinely divide their staffs and dedicate teams to each foreign customer. They even set 
procedures for making sure that engineers and buyers from different clients do not accidentally 
meet one another while having lunch at company cafeterias here. But that secrecy makes it harder 
for the Taiwanese industry to learn good ideas quickly from foreign and domestic rivals. ‘They 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 More generally, adopting an initial cooperation strategy with industry incumbents entails issues and choices of 
governing the inter-organizational relationship, and may involve contractual and/or non-contractual features.  
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keep secrets and don’t duplicate, so the customers are happy to work with them,’ said Chan Wen-
Hsin, a senior industrial technology specialist at the ministry of economic affairs.” (Bradsher, 
2013).  
The quote illustrates the type of challenges of changing the formal and informal structure of the 
organization to align with a switch in commercialization strategy. More generally, the wide-spanning 
personnel capabilities associated with product market entry may no longer be as compelling in a licensing 
regime, which instead might emphasize R&D excellence, and so a range of human resource challenges 
may also accompany changes in commercialization strategy.  
Any of these considerations may dissuade an entrepreneur from pursing a switchback strategy. If funding 
is not available to finance product-market entry initially, or if the costs of adjusting back to licensing are 
too high, or if the disclosure that occurs in the product market forecloses future licensing, a switchback 
strategy may not be indicated. 
 
4.1.2 Considerations for incumbents 
Incumbents exploring licensing deals with entrepreneurs who previously competed in the product market 
also have several considerations. Perhaps most importantly, what will the nature of product-market 
exclusivity be? Product market participants may have long-term distribution contracts they must honor, 
which could make it difficult for them to immediately and completely exit the product market. 
Alternatively, the entrepreneur may seek to remain partially in the product market, instead licensing the 
core innovation for new markets where it does not intend to compete.  
Moreover, how does an incumbent position itself as an attractive licensing partner for an entrant that may 
have moved beyond the “startup” phase by virtue of its time in the product market? Getting a "first crack" 
at accessing the startup innovation may involve building absorptive capacity in the first place to identify 
the most promising emerging technologies. This may involve a host of investments including striking 
alliances, engaging in research consortia in industry or at academic institutions, etc. These investments 
will not always yield a payoff for a variety of reasons, due to the inherent nature of research and 
development. Yet developing a reputation for experimentation and being in the vanguard of technical 
development may be important in becoming a preferred partner when an innovator decides that it wishes 
to adopt a cooperation strategy rather than a product competition strategy.    
 
4.2 Temporary cooperation considerations 
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4.2.1 Considerations for technology entrepreneurs 
For entrants pursuing a temporary cooperation strategy, a threat to the first-stage licensing strategy is that 
the partner may be reticent to strike a deal with the innovator for fear of helping to develop a formidable 
competitor down the road. Moreover, even if the partner consents to an alliance or licensing arrangement, 
they may place contractual or non-contractual restrictions that might dampen the entrant’s ability to 
accelerate their specialized complementary asset development using this learning channel. Anticipating 
this behavior, the entrant might decide to obfuscate their longer-term aspirations to the partner or adopt 
other tactics. 
For example, if the incumbent is wary of partnering with the entrant for fear of breeding its own 
competitor, the entrant may try to allay this fear by agreeing contractually to certain terms that might be 
interpreted as a signal against the entrant's aspirations of eventual product market entry. This may involve 
a long-term contractual relationship or a broad agreement across market verticals involving joint 
commercialization. This may be limiting for the entrant, however, and so may diminish the value of the 
temporary cooperation switchback strategy in the first place—especially when the startup is centered on a 
single innovation. Entrepreneurs who anticipate having multiple distinct innovations, however, may be 
able to sacrifice exclusivity on their first innovation in exchange for learning general product-market 
expertise which will be valuable in directly commercializing future innovations. 
A final challenge for the entrant is the channel conflict that may arise from competing with former 
cooperation partners. (Note that entrepreneurs undertaking a temporary competition strategy worry less 
about channel conflict because they are likely selling to former competitors, whereas in this case the 
entrepreneur is now competing with former partners.) More broadly, the organizational challenges of 
transitioning personnel and incentive systems to one of product market entry from licensing may be 
substantial, as previously discussed. 
 
4.2.2 Considerations for incumbents 
Incumbents also face a number of challenges associated with the innovator temporary cooperation 
strategy. The challenge of screening out would-be forward integrators may not be easy. Assessing this 
potential threat and weighing it against the possible benefits of accessing startup innovation is a 
significant managerial challenge. Consequently, it may be advisable for an incumbent to insist on 
exclusivity either of long duration or wide industry scope in order to avoid enabling a direct competitor. 
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Because startups typically have higher powered human resource incentives as compared to established 
firms, the threat of hiring away employees is another challenge. This threat is compounded because joint 
commercialization development often involves exchange of personnel and/or allocating dedicated 
personnel from each side to the joint effort. Although employee non-compete agreements can stop the 
leakage of workers from one firm to another, several U.S. states including California curtail the use of 
non-competes (Marx 2011).  
  
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND CONCLUSION 
This article calls for a reconceptualization of the process by which entrepreneurs not only conceive of but 
also execute a commercialization strategy. A major contribution of extant TCS literature has been to 
establish a framework by which entrepreneurs can determine the ideal strategy for a given 
commercialization environment. This static view does not however consider the possible obstacles to the 
implementation of a preferred strategy which may necessitate a more dynamic strategy. Figure 1 attempts 
to capture the circumstances under which an entrant should consider a dynamic switchback as opposed to 
a static commercialization strategy as outlined in the TCS literature.  
Figure 1 about here 
In the sections below, we distinguish the nature of a “switchback” strategy from dynamic 
conceptualizations in the TCS literature and the strategy literature more generally. We conclude with 
thoughts on the broader implications of this research for technology commercialization strategy literature. 
 
5.1 The dynamics of switchbacks versus experimentation 
The phenomenon of risk in technology entrepreneurship is well known. In a sample of over 22,000 VC 
funded startups founded between 1987 and 2008, 75% had a liquidation value of zero while 0.39% had an 
exit value of $500 million or greater (Hall & Woodward, 2010). While the literature on entrepreneurial 
experimentation, especially at the within-firm level, aims to decrease such risk, we investigate a new 
domain emphasizing switchback strategies that may help in mitigating entrepreneurial execution risk.  
The literature on industry dynamics and technological lifecycles tends to depict each entrant as a single 
experiment3 (e.g., Klepper, 1997), but experimentation can take place not only at the industry level but 
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3 An important driver in the Jovanovic (1982) theory of industry evolution stems from entrepreneurs entering an 
industry to learn their own cost efficiency as they operate in the industry and exiting if found to be inefficient. In 
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also within a single firm. The practice-oriented literature has emphasized conducting strategic 
experiments with clear assumptions and exit criteria (McGrath & MacMillan, 1995) albeit usually in the 
context of R&D labs or other large organizations. These principles are behind the recent practice-oriented 
literature notion of entrepreneurial "pivoting." For example, in the lean startup methodology (Ries, 2011), 
startups are instructed to build a minimum viable product, introduce it to customers, and run experiments 
on various customer groups. The goal of entrepreneurs in this method is to shorten the learning feedback 
loop to guide startup actions to persevere or pivot. While the primary goal of entrepreneurial 
experimentation is trying to learn about venture viability at the least possible cost and while utilizing the 
least possible resources, strategic switchbacks take place as a result of being unable to conduct a first-best 
commercialization strategy at the outset. The indirect switchback routes we describe are meant to 
facilitate execution of the ultimate strategy.  
Like static commercialization strategies, a switchback can be determined ex ante given analysis of 
barriers to the implementation of the entrepreneur’s preferred strategy. In this way, the eventual switch 
from the initial, suboptimal commercialization strategy to the preferred one is preplanned. Thus the 
dynamic nature of a switchback strategy differs fundamentally from the entrepreneurial experimentation 
approach frequently prescribed by the academic and practitioner literature. Experimentation is principally 
useful when the entrepreneur does not have a preferred commercialization path. As Bhide (2000) states: 
"The uncertain nature of many promising opportunities also decreases the value of prior analysis. In new 
or changing markets, research can be costly because of the transient nature of the opportunity. In lieu of 
extensive planning, we will also see entrepreneurs have to rely on adaptation: they start with a sketchy 
idea of how they want to do business, which they alter and refine as they encounter unforeseen problems 
and opportunities.” Murray and Tripsas (2004) observe that experimentation need not be merely 
opportunistic; rather, entrepreneurs can engage in purposeful hypothesis testing reminiscent of McGrath 
and MacMillan’s (1995) discovery-driven planning process. In either formulation, the entrepreneur 
implements a dynamic strategy in order to reduce uncertainty. A switchback strategy, while also dynamic, 
does not depend on the presence of uncertainty and can be useful even when the desired end-state is clear. 
Note that we do not argue that experimentation has no place in formulating commercialization strategy. 
To the contrary, in the presence of uncertainty regarding either the commercialization environment or the 
barriers to implementing various commercialization strategies experimentation may be the only way to 
proceed. Moreover, entrepreneurs who choose to enter the product market (whether permanently or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contrast, venture capitalists have a variety of mechanisms to decrease their risk, such as by staging capital infusions 
(Gompers, 1995), investing in founders with prior experience (Gompers, et al., 2010), concentrating their 
investments in specialized industries (Gompers, Kovner & Lerner, 2009), and by crafting cash-flow and control-
rights in their financing contracts (e.g., Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003).  
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temporarily) may find experimentation quite useful. Augmenting our analysis to consider uncertainty is a 
clear next step.  
 
5.2 (Commercialization) strategy as an arc 
While our immediate focus is the TCS literature, the notion of dynamic commercialization strategies also 
contributes to the broader literature on strategy formulation. Like extant TCS literature, the strategy 
literature generally conceptualizes the strategic choice as selecting a particular position based on an 
assessment of the external environment and/or internal resources. In other words, the commercialization 
strategy decision is static—or, to be more precise, the selection is that of a single point on a “fitness 
landscape” of possible positions/configurations. Of course, strategy scholars have conceptualized much 
more complicated decision sets than a binary choice between licensing and product market competition 
(Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000). But consistent between the two literatures is the notion of finding an 
optimal configuration of the firm’s resources given market conditions, avoiding local maxima that might 
satisfice but not optimize. A switchback strategy necessarily involves two or more points, requiring a line 
or arc to represent the implementation of a dynamic strategy.  
However, it would be incorrect to characterize the strategy literature as entirely static. Extensive work on 
dynamic capabilities and the failure of large firms has emphasized the need for an incumbent to adapt its 
positioning when the environment shifts (Haveman, 1992; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Tripsas, 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Still, the strategic decision for any given situation is a (new) point on 
the landscape. And while the firm’s strategy might sketch an arc over time as the environment shifts, a 
switchback strategy can be dynamic even in the absence of any environmental change.  
Switchbacks are moreover distinguished from the fitness-landscape conceptualization in that the cost of 
scaling a particular “peak” is accounted for, independent of the firm’s past configuration. While the 
height of a peak in both corresponds to the attractiveness of a strategic position, in search-oriented 
formulations (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000) there is no inherent cost to relocating one’s self on a peak of 
a particular height. Rather, the cost of adjusting to a new strategy is derived from the interdependence of 
the firm’s previous configuration of activities. Menon and Yao (2012) observe various types of costs 
inherent in adopting a new strategic position. Their “history-influenced” costs correspond most closely to 
the difficulties characterized by inertia and interdependence, which have been studied frequently 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Siggelkow, 2001). However, they also note that a strategic position may be 
difficult for reasons having nothing to do with a firm’s past decisions but simply due to the challenges of 
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assembling and configuring the necessary resources. These “destination-based” costs correspond more 
closely to our notion of the grade accompanying a particular peak.  
 
5.3 Broader implications for the literature and conclusion 
The existing literature on technology commercialization strategy, particularly for entrepreneurs, 
highlights the role of the commercialization environment in shaping strategy. Furthermore, the focus is on 
setting initial entry strategy. In contrast, entrepreneurial switchback strategies emphasize the importance 
of venture execution and implementation strategy in sequencing strategic moves to reach a desired end-
state. These strategy dynamics are especially important for startup entrepreneurs, as they typically start in 
a resource-poor circumstance and as a result need to arguably be more strategic in their entry and scale-up 
approach than established firms. The second distinguishing feature of strategic switchbacks as compared 
to the prior literature on technology commercialization strategy is that we move from examining 
commercialization of a single product to considering a broader set of issues associated with 
entrepreneurial business development. For example, a main driver of the temporary cooperation 
switchback strategy is developing specialized organizational complementary assets. 
Our primary object in this article is to highlight the challenges entrepreneurs face not in determining the 
best commercialization strategy but in executing a commercialization strategy. Of course, firms can 
undertake dynamic, multi-step strategic paths which may include experimentation among unclear 
alternatives, adaptation to a changing environment, and multi-stage strategies such as we have outlined 
here. We see integrating these into a more complete dynamic framework as a topic for further study.  
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